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The existence and persistence of regional disparities is a common 
problem of many European economies. However, in Spain, this fact 
exhibits a characteristic feature: a strong positive relationship with the 
business cycle. The analysis in this paper investigates the relationship 
between this distinguishing feature of the Spanish economy with 
changes in the regional wage setting mechanism, and how this 
relationship has influenced the aggregate Spanish labour market 
performance in the recent past. The empirical finding of an important 
regional imitation effect in wage bargainings may explain both the 
persistence of disparities and the positive relationship between regional 
unemployment dispersion and the business cycle. This result has a direct 
implication on employment policies, which must take into account the 
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  11.- Introduction 
 
Despite the strong employment growth in Spain during the last years, the Spanish 
aggregate unemployment rate is still one of the highest among the European Union 
(EU) countries. In addition to the persistence of high aggregate unemployment rates 
during the last 20 years, the spatial distribution of unemployment has shown important 
and persistent regional disparities. These disparities are common to many European 
countries (European Commission, 2000, Baddeley et al., 1998, and Giannetti, 2002). 
However, they show in Spain a distinguishing feature within the EU: a strong positive 
relationship with the business cycle. 
The existence of regional disparities in the unemployment rate is a relevant economic 
problem, given its relationship with the aggregate unemployment rate and its 
implication for social welfare. In the absence of labour mobility, the persistence of 
important differences in regional unemployment rates may have a direct impact on the 
Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), given that high 
unemployment rates in poor regions do not exert a downward pressure on wage 
demands of the low unemployment regions (Layard et al., 1991, chap. 6), requiring 
thus a higher unemployment rate to keep inflation unchanged. On the other hand, and 
as is well known, the aggregate unemployment level has different repercussions on 
social welfare depending on its regional distribution, i.e., the same aggregate 
unemployment rate is compatible with very different regional distributions. 
Additionally, the existence of regional differences confirms the dismal behaviour of the 
labour market, and serves as a justification for public intervention, with the aim of 
reducing the problem in high unemployment regions, and thus, in the whole country. 
From another point of view, the high regional unemployment differentials may be a 
sign that an important share of the production in high unemployment regions is 
established on the fringes of legal markets. 
According to Marston (1985) there are two possible interpretations for the existence 
of regional disparities in the unemployment rate. The first one is related to an 
equilibrium mechanism, while the second is concerned to a disequilibrium context. 
According to the first view, each region tends to its own equilibrium unemployment 
rate, which is determined by the influence of three elements. First, some regions may 
have a greater than the national average unemployment rate due to the existence of 
demand-side determinants, as the sectoral composition of the regional production (the 
  2predominance of traditional industries and technologies), an insufficient demand for the 
regional products, etc. Second, a higher unemployment rate in some regions may be 
explained by supply-side factors, as differences in the qualification of the workforce, in 
labour and firm mobility, in housing supply, in family or social ties, in the regional 
amenities, etc. Lastly, a higher unemployment rate in a particular region could be 
explained by institutional factors, such as unemployment benefits schemes, the degree 
of wage bargain centralisation and coordination, legislation on minimum wages, union 
power, etc. Given that all of these sources of regional disparities in the unemployment 
rates vary slowly through time, the disparities themselves would tend to remain roughly 
constant. This is the reason why they are considered as an equilibrium phenomena (see 
Adams, 1985, Topel, 1986). In other words, regional disparities reflect, in the short run, 
the effect of aggregate shocks that, due to the particular characteristics of each region, 
may have different effects. In the long run, disparities are the result of the lack of 
labour and firm mobility. Workers would not move from high unemployment regions to 
low unemployment regions due to scant wage differentials given a centralised wage 
bargain system, or because labour is not sensitive to these differentials (cultural or 
language problems, real state prices...). Alternatively, capital would not move because 
high unemployment regions are generally geographically isolated and often show a low 
endowment of infrastructures.
1 Finally, it must be clarified that this concept of 
equilibrium is distinct from the “pure” competitive equilibrium, under which all of the 
regions tend towards the same unemployment rate. 
A second approach to explain the existence of regional disparities in the 
unemployment rates is based on the idea of a disequilibrium phenomenon. According to 
this view, all of the regions would tend to a “pure” competitive equilibrium outcome, 
but the adjustment mechanisms in the regional labour markets are so slow or weak, 
such that adverse shocks are not fully absorbed. This would imply that regional 
unemployment rates are permanently away from their equilibrium position. 
Specifically, departing from an initial equilibrium, a shock generates regional 
differences in the unemployment rates. After this shock, these regional unemployment 
rates tend slowly to their equilibrium value, but the adjustment is so slow that before 
reaching back their initial position they are hit by a new shock that avoids total 
                                                 
1 This argument justifies that around 35% of the EU budget is focused on the reduction of economic 
disparities among European regions, through strong investments in infrastructures and skill programs. 
Nevertheless, except in Ireland, the existence of these funds seems that only have served to reduce the 
incentives to migrate from the high unemployment regions. 
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dispersion, characterised by diverging regional unemployment rates, a kind of 
polarisation effect (Overman and Puga, 2002). Obviously, these two explanations, far 
from exclusive, are frequently complementary. Moreover, a great number of 
intermediate set-ups between those mentioned can be actually observed, depending on 
the evolution followed by each particular region (for a more detailed analysis on this 
possibility, see Baddeley et al., 1998). 
The comparison of the evolution of the regional disparities in the unemployment rates 
between Europe and the US allows a further step in the explanation of the existence and 
persistence of such disparities in Europe. The US, as in many other aspects of the 
labour market, is notably different to Europe. Regional differences between states are 
present, but do not persist. In fact, it is observed that regions which in a particular 
period show a greater than the average unemployment rate, in a few years show a lower 
rate than the average. This would reflect a disequilibrium framework with fast 
adjustment towards the competitive equilibrium (see Devens, 1988, Blanchard and 
Katz, 1992 and Bertola and Ichino, 1996). For many authors, the difference between 
Europe and the US lies in the lack of both migration and wage flexibility in the 
European Union, such that the US labour market is closer to a competitive model. This 
implies that the existence of regional disparities in the unemployment rates may be 
more easily absorbed in the US than in Europe since, first, workers may move from 
high unemployment regions to low unemployment regions; second, these workers may 
accept reductions in their wages to promote employment growth; and third, firms can 
promote capital movements, in order to get gains from cheaper workforce.
2
The existing evidence for the Spanish economy during the last 20 years seems to fit 
well the European version. Thus, external migration (and from the country side to the 
city) during the 50s and 60s was reduced during the 70s and 80s, and has even reverted 
its sign during the last decade. Since then, net interregional migration flows have been 
reduced, while intrarregional flows have increased slightly.
3 The current situation in 
Spain is characterised by low internal migration rates and persistent differences 
                                                 
2 Blanchard and Katz (1992) argue that internal migrations are the main source of regional unemployment 
rate convergence within the US. Moreover, many studies point to the higher wage flexibility is the US as 
a re-equilibrating mechanism in the labour market, even though this explanation is rejected by authors as 
Freeman (1995) or Baddeley et al. (2000). For a discussion of the European case, see Decresin and Fatás 
(1995). 
3 For a detailed analysis of migratory movements in Spain see Ródenas (1994), Bentolila (1997, 2001), 
Antolín and Bover (1997), Bóver and Velilla (1999) and de la Fuente (1999). 
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4 Concerning firms’ localisation, they have 
tended to locate in the development poles (Madrid, Ebro Axis and the Mediterranean 
Coast), i.e., in the lowest unemployment regions. This empirical fact rejects the 
hypothesis of firms moving from one region to another in order to benefit from a 
cheaper workforce. Rather, the predictions of the New Economic Geography on 
positive externalities of agglomeration (Krugman, 1998) seem to better suit the current 
description. Finally, wage flexibility has been found to be low, as in other EU 
countries. Specifically, the elasticity of wages to changes in the regional unemployment 
rate is low, around –0.1, indicating that high unemployment rates are followed by weak 
reductions in wages, as Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) and García and Montuenga (2003) 
have shown. 
In this paper we focus on this last kind of explanations by linking the lack of wage 
flexibility with the performance of labour market institutions in Spain. During the last 
years, the literature has related the differences in the national unemployment across 
countries to differences between their corresponding labour market institutions. 
However, this sort of arguments have not been used to explain unemployment rate 
differences at the regional level. The reason seems to be clear; the main features of the 
labour market institutions (minimum wages, dismissal costs, unemployment benefits, 
legally worked hours and wage bargaining) are common to all of the regions within a 
country, as it happens in Spain.
5 This fact, hence, limits its potential explanatory power 
for the problem of regional disparities in the unemployment rate.  
However, some of the labour market institutions may have important effects at the 
regional level. Specifically, regional disparities in unemployment may be sustained 
provided that the wage bargaining system prevalent in the economy avoids that wages 
act as an adjusting mechanism, given that bargained wages show low response to 
changes in the regional, local or firm conditions. In particular, if labour productivity is 
different across regions and the wage bargain is centralised, those areas in which 
productivity is low will not be able to create additional employment because unit labour 
costs may be too high as a result of the wages agreed at the national level. A similar 
situation can be reached, even when wage bargaining is geographically decentralised, 
(as in Spain), if relative payment criteria or wage imitation effects are explicitly 
                                                 
4 A similar situation is found in Italy by Faini et al., (1997) and Brunello et al., (2001). 
5 The Spanish legal system establishes a general principle of equal treatment to workers, independently of 
their regional localisation. 
  5introduced into the wage setting mechanism (see Saint Paul, 1997, Brunello et al., 
2001, Bande et al., 2001). 
The aim of this paper is to provide an explanation for the existence and the 
persistence of regional disparities in the unemployment rate, departing from the 
analysis of the wage setting mechanism prevailing in Spain. This analysis may allow us 
to bring into light another differential fact of the Spanish labour market: the strong 
relationship between regional disparities and the business cycle. Even though this 
relationship is common to many EU countries, in Spain it reaches an intensity far above 
the average, and may be one of the elements that has influenced negatively the 
aggregate result of the Spanish labour market. The empirical finding of an important 
wage imitation effect in the wage bargaining, specially in those less dynamic sectors of 
the less productive regions, may explain both the persistence of the regional disparities 
in unemployment and its positive relationship with the business cycle. This result has 
an immediate implication for policy. Governmental policies aiming at reducing 
unemployment should focus on the regional dimension of the problem, and would 
require a substantial reform of the Spanish wage bargain system, allowing for a greater 
decentralisation (Segura, 2001 and Bentolila and Jimeno, 2002). 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes, for the Spanish economy, the 
existence and persistence of regional disparities in the unemployment rate. This 
analysis confirms the strong relationship between the regional unemployment 
dispersion and the business cycle. Section 3 shows a single model to present the 
empirical specification, while Section 4 offers an estimation of the Spanish wage 
setting mechanism and interprets the empirical findings. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2.- The Facts: existence and persistence of regional disparities in the 
unemployment rate and its relationship with the business cycle 
The aim of this section is to analyse the regional behaviour of Spanish unemployment 
since the 1980s. First, we develop a comparative static analysis, consisting in 
examining the distribution of regional unemployment at different moments of time. 
Even though all of the dynamic aspects of the evolution followed by each region are 
omitted, the comparison over time will provide an intuitive picture of the existence and 
persistence of regional disparities in the unemployment rate. Second, we consider the 
issue of potential different regional behaviour in response to changes in the business 
cycle. 
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2.1. Existence and persistence of regional disparities in unemployment 
In Table 1 we show the ranking of regional unemployment rates in different moments 
of time since 1981 until 2001.
6 During the last 20 years, Andalusia and Extremadura 
have been located at the bottom of the regional distribution, with unemployment rates 
much greater than the average. Until the mid 1990s, the Canary Islands and the Basque 
Country followed them closely, but more recently they have improved their relative 
position, being replaced by Galicia and Asturias, which have exhibited a negative 
evolution of their macroeconomic aggregates.
7 In the other extreme of the distribution, 
the Balearic Islands, La Rioja, Aragón and Navarre have always stood into the group of 
regions with lower unemployment rates. Despite the evident persistence of the 
disparities that can be observed in Table 1 -only 4 out of 17 Spanish regions have 
exhibited a change in their trend, moving from a relative position below (above) the 
average to another above (below) the average- a relative degree of mobility can be 
observed. 
On the other hand, the differences between the extremes of the distribution have not 
been reduced during our analysis period. Thus, in 1981 the difference between 
Andalusia (the region with the highest unemployment rate) and Galicia (the region with 
the lowest rate) was of 13.6 points. In 1986, the difference between both regions (both 
were in the same position of the scale) had increased slightly up to 16.6 points. In 1991 
Andalusia was still the region with the highest unemployment rate, and the difference 
with respect to the region with lowest unemployment rate (La Rioja) had been slightly 
reduced to 16.1 points. In 1996 the difference rose again up to 20.9 points. Finally in 
2001, the first place in the ranking was still occupied by Andalusia, with an 
unemployment rate of 21.8%, while the region with the lowest unemployment rate was 
                                                 
6 All the information used here come from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA), elaborated by the 
Spanish National Statistics Institute, according to the European standard issued by Eurostat. The deep 
reform of the EPA undertook in 2002, consisting in the change of the elevation factors and in the 
adaptation of the definition of unemployed to the one proposed by Eurostat, implies a clear break in the 
sample. The lack of homogenous data forces us to stop our analysis in this year. However, given the new 
definition, the situation described along the following paragraphs has not changed much since 2002. 
7 The situation of Asturias is peculiar. With the new definition provided by the Labour Force Survey, 
Asturias would be included into the group of regions with the lowest unemployment rates. This result 
would be explained by both the new definition of unemployed (the discouraged worker effect among the 
unemployed workers may be higher in regions facing strong industrial restructuring, as Asturias) and by 
the correction of the elevation factors (Asturias loses population and has not received relevant incoming 
migration). Thus, from an unemployment rate of 14.44%, it has moved to a 7.84%, a reduction of more 
than 45%. The shattering path followed by Galicia has been deeply analysed in Bande and Fernandez 
(1999, 2003) and in Fernández and Polo (2002). 
  7Navarre, with a rate of 6.2%, which implies a difference of 15.6 points. Similarly, the 
increasing trend in regional unemployment dispersion, measured through the standard 
deviation, seems to be stabilised only during the last years. In summary, we find the 
presence of high regional unemployment rates in Spain, and a marked persistence of the 
regional differences through time.. 
 
Table 1 
Regional Unemployment Ranking 
  1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 
Navarre  9 8 4 1 1 
Balearic  Islands  3 2 3 2 2 
La  Rioja  2 4 1 3 3 
Aragón  7 5 2 4 4 
Catalonia  13  13  6 6 5 
Madrid  12  10  5 9 6 
Basque Country  14  14  14  10  7 
Valencia 10  11  11  12  8 
Castilla-León  5 7 9 8 9 
Castilla-La Mancha  11  3  8  7  10 
Murcia  8  12 13 14 11 
Canary  Islands  15 15 16 13 12 
Cantabria  4  6  12 15 13 
Asturias  6  9  10 11 14 
Galicia 1  1  7  5  15 
Extremadura  16 16 15 16 16 
Andalusia  17 17 17 17 17 
Standard  Deviation  0.034 0.046 0.051 0.054 0.052 
Aggregate 
Unemployment  Rate  14.3 20.9 16.3 22.2 12.9 
Difference between 
extrema  13.6 16.6 16.1 20.9 15.6 
Source: EPA and own elaboration. Regions are ordered according to their unemployment rate, from 
lower to higher rates, measured at year 2001. 
2.2. Regional disparities and the business cycle 
The analysis of the evolution in the long run of the regional unemployment rates has 
been a recurrent topic in the spatial economics literature (Evans and McCormick, 1994, 
Martin, 1997, Taylor and Bradley, 1997, and for Spain, Villaverde and Maza, 2002, 
López-Bazo et al., 2002, Aláez et al., 2003). However the analysis of the relationship 
between these unemployment rates and the aggregate economic fluctuations has not 
been as much analysed. Some empirical studies (see among others Dunford and Perron, 
1994, Mackay, 1994, Hess and Shin, 1997) point to the existence of a tendency for 
regional disparities (measured through absolute dispersion figures, as the standard 
  8deviation) to be reduced during the expansive parts of the business cycle, and to be 
increased during economic downturns. More recently, Martin (1999), Pekhonen and 
Tervo (1998) and Baddeley et al. (1998), among other authors, offer similar results for 
different European countries, even though they do not consider the Spanish case. 
The arguments for this general results are varied. First, poor regions show a greater 
share of GDP produced by the less dynamic industries, and hence they are probably 
more affected (and for a longer period of time) by aggregate shocks. Moreover, the 
ability of adjustment in the less developed regions is lower, because those firms with a 
more adapted technology to absorb demand shocks would have been located in the 
developed regions, to benefit from localisation and agglomeration externalities (Puga, 
2002). Lastly, during economic downturns, migration can be less intense (Pissarides 
and McMaster, 1990), and this will reduce its ability to even regional labour markets. 
Being such result common to many European countries, we may ask if this is true 
also for Spain. Villaverde and Maza (2002), with a dataset from FUNCAS,
8 show that 
when dispersion is measured in absolute terms, there exists a direct correlation between 
dispersion and the national unemployment rate, at least since the beginning of the 
1990s. Graph 1, with data coming from the Labour Force Survey, reveals that, in Spain, 
the standard deviation has exhibited a slightly upward sloping trend during the last 20 
years, indicating no relationship with the business cycle (a similar result is found by 
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Graph 1.Aggregate Unemployment rate and absolute dispersion (standard deviation) 
 
                                                 
8 Fundación de las Cajas de Ahorros (Saving Banks Foundation)  
  9This behaviour has a distinguishing feature in Spain. Table 2 shows the correlation 
coefficient between the standard deviation of the regional unemployment rates and the 
aggregate unemployment rate for the sample period analysed. It can be observed that, 
while in most European countries theres exists a clear positive correlation between 
absolute regional disparities and the aggregate unemployment rate, -even though with 
clearly different individual behaviours, for instance, the correlation coefficient varies 




Correlation coefficient between aggregate unemployment rate and the 
standard deviation of the regional unemployment rates. 1986-2001. 
Country 
Number of 
regions Corr.  Coef. 
Belgium 11  0.32 
Germany 41  0.76 
Greece
a 13 0.82 
Spain 17  0.03 
France
b 22 0.40 
Italy 20  0.55 
Netherlands
a 12 0.71 
Portugal 7  0.40 
U.K. 37  0.68 
Notes: Own elaboration from the Regio Database, Eurostat 
a. data from 1988 to 2001 
b. overseas regions not considered 
 
A second evidence can be obtained from the use of a relative dispersion index. This 
measure allows to determine, through an alternative way, if regional unemployment 
rates are oriented towards higher or lower degree of convergence during the period of 





























RDC      (1) 
where Lj and LN are the labour force in region j and in the aggregate economy, 
respectively, Uj is the unemployment rate in region j  and UN is the aggregate 
unemployment rate. The lower bound of this measure is zero, which means that all of 
the regions have the same unemployment rate. The evolution through time of this 
coefficient shows directly the evolution of the degree of convergence. A big reduction 
                                                 
9 Note that a negative relationship between the dispersion measure and the aggregate unemployment rate 
is a sign of a positive relationship between the evolution of regional disparities and the business cycle. 
  10in this ratio is interpreted as a clear process of convergence. On the other hand, if the 
coefficient rises or stabilises during a period of time, we may conclude that the regional 
unemployment rates are following a diverging process. 
Table 3 summarises, for the same group of European countries as in Table 2, the 
relative dispersion coefficient in 1986 and 2001 including, additionally, the correlation 
coefficient between this relative dispersion measure and the aggregate unemployment 
rate for the whole period. 
 
Table 3 
Relative dispersion coefficient (RDC) and correlation bewteen RDC and the 
aggregate unemployment rate. 1986 and 2001 











Belgium 11  11.2  0.26  6.6  0.54  -0.638 




a 10.2 0.28  -0.268 
Spain 17  21.4  0.22  13.1  0.35  -0.948 
France 22  10  0.16  8.5  0.29  -0.289 




a 2.3 0.37 -0.768 
Portugal 7 8.6  0.45  4  0.34  -0.319 
U.K. 37  17.7  0.31  7.4  0.44  -0.137 
Notes: Own elaboration from Regio Database, Eurostat 
a data from 1988 
b Overseas regions not considered 
c Correlation coefficiente between the aggregate unemployment rate and the RDC for the period 1986-2001. 
 
The results obtained allow us to conclude that the regional problem is greater 
nowadays than it was in the 1980s, because dispersion has increased (only in Portugal 
regional differences seem to have been reduced), in spite of the great effort developed 
by the European Union to fight against territorial imbalances through the structural 
funds. Additionally, Spain shows a noticeably different behaviour from the other group 
of countries. Even though the increase in dispersion is similar to other countries (or 
even lower), the response of regional differences to business cycle is very sensitive 
(correlation coefficient of –0.949). By contrast, in other countries, as Italy, Portugal, the 
UK or Germany, where regional differences are also marked, such coefficient is much 
lower (it does not take values lower than –0.30, and even for Germany it is positive). 
Let us now focus on the evolution of the relationship between regional unemployment 
rates dispersion and the aggregate unemployment rate. Graph 2 shows this evolution for 
the period 1983-2001, which includes different periods in the Spanish business cycle. 
  11When we consider this relative dispersion measure, the negative relationship with the 
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Graph 2. Aggregate unemployment rate and relative dispersion (RDC) 
 
Focusing our attention in the years after 1986, when Spain joined the European 
Community (EC), we first observe that there was a strong economic upturn, with a 
solid process of employment creation (1.7 million new jobs between 1986 and 1991), 
which translated into a reduction of the aggregate unemployment rate of 6 percentage 
points, but also into an important increase in the regional disparities. From 1991 to 
1994, the Spanish economy suffered from one of the most important recessions in the 
last decades (the GDP showed a negative growth rate of 1.3% in 1993). At the same 
time, employment reduced in almost 900,000 jobs during this period. This led 
unemployment rate to rise 8 percentage points, reaching its historical ceiling in the first 
quarter of 1994, with a value of 24.1%. At the same time, regional disparities fell 
sharply. Since then, the new upturn in economic activity has been followed by increases 
in regional differences. The dispersion coefficient has experienced a sustained increase 
during this last period. This process has coincided with a divergence process in the 
regional unemployment rates, in which simultaneous processes of strong employment 
creation and reduction of the aggregate unemployment rate have been observed, being 
the latter much stronger than in the 1986-1991 period. 
Given all of these findings we may provide three conclusions. First, during the last 
years, Spain has not experienced a convergence in the regional unemployment rates. 
This implies that nowadays, regional dispersion is greater than it was when Spain 
joined the EC. Second, the response of regional labour markets to changes in the 
business cycle is very heterogeneous. This is translated into a marked relationship 
  12between the business cycle and regional dispersion. Although other countries exhibit 
similar characteristics concerning the relationship between regional disparities and 
business cycle, the intensity of such relationship is much stronger in Spain. This fact 
requires a differential explanation. Finally, these results suggest that the magnitude of 
the regional dimension of the Spanish unemployment problem is mainly determined by 
the evolution of the business cycle. 
 
3.- A tentative explanation: the wage setting mechanism 
In the previous section we have described the existence and persistence of regional 
disparities in the unemployment rate in Spain, and how they show a very intense 
relationship with the business cycle. There are many theoretical arguments that have 
been proposed in the literature to explain the existence of regional disparities in the 
unemployment rate. However, when these arguments are applied to the Spanish 
economy, any of them is always partial because it does not allow to interpret the 
relationship between the regional unemployment rates dispersion and the business 
cycle. Thus, in this section we will explore an alternative argument, probably 
complementary to those previously proposed, that tries to address such peculiar 
relationship. This will be based on the role of the wage setting mechanism and its 
influence on regional unemployment rates. 
Our hypothesis is the following: when the sectoral level dominates wage bargaining, 
and this bargaining is neither fully centralised nor coordinated at the regional level, 
then there is scope for an important wage imitation effect in the wage-setting process 
within sectors in different regions,which can have relevant effects on aggregate and 
regional unemployment rates. This seems to be the case of Spain (see Table 4 below), 
especially after 1986, when the national social agreements, designed to fight against 
inflation, by the settlement of fixed narrow bandwidths for wage growth, disappeared. 
Since that year, wage setting moved to an increasingly decentralised framework, which 
was stimulated by the subsequent reforms of the labour markets (see Jimeno and 
Bentolila, 2005).  
Furthermore, since real wages in Spain show downward rigidity but are upward 
flexible, the imitation process affects regional unemployment disparities through the 
business cycle, given that during an upturn the imitation effect can induce a higher gap 
between wage and productivity growth than during downturns, which in turn implies 
different evolutions in real unit labour costs.On its part, the imitation effect is not only 
  13found between sectors within a region, but when the geographical dimension is 
considered (regional and provincial wage bargaining) the imitation is possible between 
sectors in different regions aswell. So, during economic upturns, the most dynamic 
industries/regions will exhibit wage increases that would be imitated by the less 
dynamic industries/regions. The same happens during economic downturns, but with an 
important difference: during the upturns, the differential between wage and productivity 
will be much greater in the less productive industries/regions than during economic 
downturns. If these sectors/regions keep this imitation behaviour in their wage setting, 
they will increase the disparities between regions due to different behaviour of real unit 
labour costs. 
This explanation is not new. Fair wage hypothesis (Kahneman et al., 1986, Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1990, Ball and Moffit, 2002), have served as starting points of some 
models, where it is explicitly assumed that wages in one region may be determined by 
wages bargained in other regions (see Saint Paul, 1997). A similar argument has been 
used by Brunello et al., (2001) to explain how, in Italy, the wage level set in the 
Northern regions is used as a reference to establish the wage level in the Southern 
regions, such that, the unemployment rates in the latter do not exert any influence on 
aggregate wages. This fact gives rise to the existence and persistence of strong regional 
disparities in the unemployment rates. 
Since our argument relies on the wage bargaining structure, before developing our 
empirical work to test this hypothesis, we summarise briefly the main characteristics of 
the wage bargaining model in Spain (for more details see, for example, Jimeno and 
Bentolila, 2005). In Table 4, with data published by the Ministry of Labour (Ministerio 
de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales), it is observed that, as regards the number of workers 
covered, sectoral agreements are the norm in Spain. Within this kind of agreements, the 
province territorial level is the most relevant, followed by the national level. Altogether 
they represent around the 80% of the total number of covered workers. On the contrary, 
the firm-level agreements are less important (the proportion of workers covered by this 
type of agreements is below 15%) and has been reduced during the last decade. 
Simultaneously, the sectoral-regional agreements have experienced an increase to about 
the 9% in 2002. With respect to the agreed wage increases (see Appendix B), the 
official statistics show that these are lower at the firm-level than at the upper level 
agreements. Also, we find that within the sectoral agreements, the highest wage 
increases are found in the province and region levels, while the wage increase at the 
  14national level (with the exception of 1999 and 2000) are lower, but higher than the 
firm-level ones. This fact is an evidence that, often, sectoral or national agreements set 
wage growths that are greater than those that the specific conditions of a particular firm 
may afford, especially in the less productive regions. 
 
Table 4.Workers covered by type of wage agreement. (in %). 
Spain. 1982-2002 
   Firm-level Sectoral  level 
   Province  Regional  National 
1982  16 53.1 2.2 28.3 
1983  17.4 53.7  4.3  24 
1984  17.4 53.7  3.8  24.9 
1985  17.5 53.6  3.8  24.7 
1986  17.6 53  2.6 26.5 
1987  16.3 54.1  2.7  26.5 
1988  15.8  54.5 2 27.8 
1989  15.4 54.4  2.9  27 
1990  15.5 57.2  3.8  23.2 
1991  14.9  56 3.9 25 
1992  15.3 54.8  4.7  25.1 
1993  13.9 55  9.3 21.6 
1994  12.7 55.9  7.1  24 
1995  13.8 55.1  2.8  28 
1996  13.5 53.6  5.3  27.6 
1997  12.4 51.5  5.8  30.4 
1998  12.2 52  6  29.8 
1999  12.4 52.2  5.5  29.8 
2000  11.5 52.4  7.8  28.3 
2001  10.9 54.3  9.3  24.6 
2002  9.9 55.8 9.4 23.9 
Source: Ministry of Labour. Estadísticas de Convenios colectivos de trabajo 
 
In order to test our hypothesis, and given that our data availability is reduced, at this 
stage of the research we have opted for a reduced form approach, through which we 
will estimate a wage equation with some features that will allow us to test the existence 
of a wage imitation effect in regional wage setting. The analysis will be done through 
the estimation of a wage setting equation at the sectoral level, in which we explain the 
observed wage as a function of internal and external variables (see Nickell and Kong, 
1992 and Graafland and Lever, 1996), for the period 1980-1995. With the aim of 
  15maintaining a simple structure, and as has been suggested in other empirical works
10 
(Andrés and García, 1991, Fernández and Montuenga, 2001, Bande et al., 2001) we 
assume that the observed real wage in a certain sector is a linear function of sectoral 
productivity and the alternative wage to this sector. This relationship is of the form: 
ijt
a
ijt ijt ij ijt w w ε β β α + + Π + = 2 1 0   (2) 
where αijo is sectoral fixed effect, wijt is real wage in sector i of region j, Πijt is labour 
productivity in sector i of region j, reflecting the internal conditions of the sector, w
a
ijt  
is the alternative wage of sector i in region j (to be defined below), reflecting the 
outside opportunities of workers, and εijt is a random error term. All the variables are 
expressed in logs. This equation is estimated for the Spanish regions in next section. 
 
4. Data description and empirical results 
In order to estimate equation (2) we use data from the BD-MORES database, 
published by the D.G. de Análisis y Programación Presupuestaria and the University 
of Valencia for the period 1980-1995. Specifically, the variables used in our empirical 
work are the following. The sectoral wage has been proxied by the ratio of labour 
income to the number of wage-earners. Labour productivity has been proxied by the 
ratio of Gross Value Added (GVA) at factors cost to the number of employed workers. 
Finally, the alternative wage has been calculated through two different ways. First, we 
calculated the average wage outside the sector within the region. A second measure of 
the alternative wage has been the national average wage. All of the variables have been 
deflated by the GVA deflator, provided by the same database. 
Thus we construct a panel with 15 sectors (Agriculture and Energy are excluded, see 
Appendix A for description of the dataset)
11 and 17 regions. We finally pooled the 
sectors according to the regional relative unemployment rates. Thus, we constructed 
three groups of regions, each with 15 sectors and a variable number of regions. In 
Group 1 we include those regions where the unemployment rates have behaved worse 
than the national unemployment rate (that is to say, those regions that departed from  
lower rates than the national unemployment rate and have ended up with rates higher 
than the average). These regions are Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla-León, Castilla-La 
                                                 
10 Fernández et al. (2000) show that the inclusion of other relevant variables (as the degree of 
concentration in the markets, the union power, etc.) does not improve the quality of the estimation. This 
allows us to be confident about our theoretical framework. 
11 Agriculture is excluded given the reduced number of wage earners with respect to the total number of 
workers. Energy is excluded because of the extremely high market value of labour productivity. 
  16Mancha and Galicia. Group 2 is composed by those regions where unemployment rates 
have behaved better than the national unemployment rate throughout the sample. These 
regions are Aragón, Balearic Islands, Catalonia, Madrid, Navarre and La Rioja. Finally, 
in Group 3 we include those regions whose unemployment rate have persistently been 
larger than the national average: Andalusia, Canary Islands, Extremadura, Murcia, 
Valencia and the Basque Country. Graph 3 shows the relative unemployment rate of 
each group, measured as the ratio of total unemployed to total labour force in each 
group divided by the aggregate unemployment rate, and clearly shows the different 
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Graph 3. Relative regional unemployment rates. 1976-2001 
Initial estimates of equation (2) showed signs of misspecification, especially 
concerning serial correlation. We estimated different versions of this equation, 
including several with the regional and/or the national unemployment rates as external 
variables. These two variables nevertheless never became significant (as in Brunello et 
al., 2001 for Italy or Jimeno and Bentolila, 1998 for Spain), and thus are not included in 
our empirical work. Given these misspecification results, and that both labour 
productivity and the alternative wage are likely to be endogenous in this context, we 
estimated our model using the generalised method of moments (GMM) proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). The equation is estimated in first differences, in order to 
eliminate the fixed effects. Thus if, as assumed, the random shock is white noise, the 
residuals of our estimated equation should show first-order correlation, but no second-
order correlation. Our instruments are regional variables lagged from t-2 backwards. 
Finally, the national aggregate wage is treated as strictly exogenous. 
  17Table 5 summarises the results of our estimations. Focusing on the first columns of 
each panel, we observe the estimated coefficients for our entire sample period, 1980-
1995. This estimation does not show substantial differences concerning the relationship 
between the real wage and both labour productivity and the alternative wage in the 
different groups of regions. Thus, we observe that the short-run elasticity of the real 
wage with respect to productivity is similar for the three groups (between 0.31 and 
0.47) while the alternative wage shows a slightly higher elasticity in Groups 2 and 3. 
These results suggest that elements related to the alternative income are important in 
wage setting, but do not provide an explanation for the existence and persistence of 
regional unemployment disparities. In fact, for our argument to be supported we should 
expect that the alternative wage should be of greater importance in Group 1, i.e., those 
regions that have behaved worse in terms of unemployment. One explanation for these 
preliminary unfavourable results is that during the sample period some important 
changes in the institutions affecting wage setting have taken place, such that the 
estimated coefficient for the whole period represents an average for two different 
periods of time.  
In fact, there has been a fundamental change in wage setting in the Spanish labour 
market. Since 1977 until 1986 the Spanish wage bargaining was highly centralised and 
coordinated, especially in what centralisation is concerned. This was due to the 
existence of extensive social agreements, binding at the national level and with inter-
sectoral scope. These agreements established, for the whole economy, maximum 
ceilings in the wage growth with a narrow bandwidth, as a way to fight against 
inflation.
12 The final agreed wage growth was later determined at the sectoral or firm-
level agreements.
13 This model was abandoned in 1986, when the last social national 
agreement was signed. Distrust among unions, firms and government, joined with a 
favourable upturn in the business cycle lead to a breakdown of the agreements, and the 
wage bargaining mechanism began a decentralisation process, in the sense that the 
fixed bandwidths were eliminated. This fact gave rise to the apparition of a higher 
dispersion in wage growth across sectors and regions, even within the same wage 
bargaining structure. 
                                                 
12 The inflation rate measured by the consumer price index reduced from 26.4% in 1977 to 8.3% in 1986. 
This reduction in inflation was accompanied by a marked reduction in the purchasing power of workers. 
13 OECD (1997) shows that Spain was among the group of countries with the highest levels of wage 
bargaining centralisation in 1980. However, in 1994 it moved to an intermediate centralisation level. 
  18Thus, in order to take into account the possible break in the wage-setting mechanism, 
we split the sample into two subsamples. The first goes from 1980 to 1988
14, and the 
second one from 1989 to 1995. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 5 summarise the results of 
the estimation of the wage regressions for the different groups of regions. We clearly 
see that our main hypothesis gains support. First, focusing on Group 1, note that before 
1988 the alternative wage was not significant, being wages mainly determined by 
productivity. In Group 2 the alternative wage was significant, with its value being lower 
than the one found for the whole period. Additionally, productivity did not play any 
role in wage setting during this first sub-period. Finally in Group 3, the relevance of the 
alternative wage was clearly higher than in Group 1. After the decentralisation process 
of the wage bargaining, the situation changed dramatically. Thus, in Group 1 the 
elasticity with respect to the alternative wage increased up to 0.85, being highly 
significant. Additionally, the elasticity of real wages to productivity reduced in this 
group, from 0.53 to 0.26. In the second group of regions, a completely different 
behaviour is found. Note that even though the coefficient on the alternative wage was 
slightly smaller than in the first sub-period, the productivity coefficient rose up to 0.48. 
Finally, in Group 3 (those regions that have been in the same relative bad position 
through time) the coefficients on the alternative wage and productivity are 
approximately similar during the two subsamples.  
Table 5. GMM estimation. Regional alternative wage 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
  80-95 80-88 89-95 80-95 80-88 89-95  80-95  80-88  89-95 
Productivity  0,473* 0,531*  0,257* 0,308* 0,123  0,484* 0,440* 0,436*  0,542* 
  (4,13) (6,06) (2,07) (2,52) (0,93) (3,97)  (4,21)  (2,59)  (2,23) 
Alt. Wage  0,549* 0,187 0,846* 0,708* 0,683* 0,647* 0,710*  0,537*  0,668* 
  (4,83) (0,89) (6,69) (5,51) (3,06) (5,36)  (6,47)  (2,07)  (5,65) 
              
              
              
M1  -2,27 -2,06 -0,46 -1,89 -2,19  1,99  -2,7  -2,45  -0,25 
M2  -1,07 -1,3 -0,11  -1,25 -1,46 0,45  -1,73  -2,16  -0,45 
Obs  1125 600  450 1320 704  528  1335  712  534 
Notes: Differenced GMM estimation robust to heterokedasticity. Instruments are lags of the endogenous and 
exogenous variables. t-statistics in parenthesis. The alternative wage is the going wage outside the sector within 
the region. M1 and M2 are the first and second order autocorrelation Arellano and Bond tests. Obs. is the number 
of observations in each regression. * stands for those significant coefficients. 
 
                                                 
14 Jimeno (1992) finds that the average duration of a wage agreement is around one year and a half. Thus 
1988 should be the first year where the increase of decentralisation is present in the bargaining. 
  19Thus, we find evidence in favour of our hypothesis. The decentralisation process 
implied that, in a number of regions, wages in a particular sector were linked to external 
conditions within the region. However, this cannot be considered as a “pure” wage 
imitation effect at the regional dimension in this context, since regional wages depend 
only on own regional variables. In order to come by more robust conclusions, we must 
estimate a different model, considering as the alternative wage the national average 
wage. The results of such estimation are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. GMM Estimation. National alternative wage 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
  80-95 80-88 89-95 80-95 80-88 89-95 80-95  80-88  89-95 
Productivity  0,435* 0,517*  0,325* 0,149  -0,009  0,499* 0,377* 0,435* 0,561* 
  (3,77)  (5,23)  (2,93)  (1,1)  (-0,06) (4,46)  (3,28) (2,11) (2,57) 
Nat. Alt. Wage  0,990* 0,348 1,300* 1,040* 0,965* 0,976* 1,040*  0,597  1,099* 
  (5,4) (0,79)  (7,87)  (5,97) (2,17) (6,32)  (7,1)  (1,61)  (6,36) 
                 
                 
                 
M1  -2,36  -2,07  -0,53  -1,76  -2,06  1,32 -2,75 -2,41 -0,58 
M2  -0,83 -1,22  -0,2  -1,08 -1,39  0,69  -1,28  -2,02  0,19 
Obs  1125 600  450 1320 704  528  1335  712  534 
Notes: Difference GMM estimation robust to heterokedasticity. Instruments are lags of the endogenous and 
exogenous variables. t-statistics in parenthesis. The alternative wage is the national average wage. M1 and M2 are 
the first and second order autocorrelation Arellano and Bond tests. Obs. is the number of observations in each 
regression. * stands for those significant coefficients. 
 
The results in this table confirm the change in the wage setting mechanism between 
the two subperiods, reflected by the different estimated coefficients for productivity and 
the national alternative wage in the three groups of regions. A common finding for the 
three groups, for the whole period analysed, is that the estimated coefficient for the 
national alternative wage is close to the unity, and even greater during the second 
period in groups 1 and 3. This result can be interpreted as indication of the existence of 
an important relative payment effect. The end of the social agreements stimulated the 
influence of the alternative wage in bargaining through two channels. First, all workers 
were willing to imitate the wage fixed by the sectors in the most dynamic regions, 
departing from their specific sectorial conditions; second, workers in the dynamic 
sectors were willing to obtain a relative payment because, given the economic upturn, 
they were trying to obtain a higher share of the rents within the sector. This second 
channel is reinforced by the behaviour of firms, which are ready to pay a higher wage 
to maintain the most productive workers (efficiency wages hypothesis).  
  20Focusing now on the differences across groups, for the whole period estimates in 
Table 6 show that the productivity coefficient is similar in Groups 1 and 3, but non-
significant in Group 2. However these estimated coefficients hide big differences 
between subperiods: Group 1 decreases its linkage to productivity; groups 3 increases 
this linkage but with a significant coefficient for both periods; it is in Group 2 where 
the most important changes are found, since it increases the elasticity of wages to 
productivity from a non-significant coefficient up to 0.5, being highly significant. 
Besides, during the 1980-88 period, the alternative wage had reduced influence in 
determining the sectoral wage rise in Groups 1 and 3, whereas in the period 1989-95, 
the coefficient was clearly above unity which implies that real wages grew over 
productivity (unit labour costs increased during this period, see Graph 4). By contrast, 
the coefficient of the alternative wage was basically the same throughout the whole 
period in Group 2.  
Considering all together, it can be conjectured that in the regions of Group 1 
employment did not raise as much as it could during the expansive period, because of 
the great change in the relative influence of productivity and the alternative wage in the 
wage setting: productivity played a less important role since 1988, whereas the 
alternative wage, by contrast, was much more relevant during this period than in 
preceeding one. In regions of Group 2, the change in the wage setting mechanism went 
into a different direction: there was a significant increase in the productivity coefficient 
with practically the same alternative wage coefficient. On consequence, the wage- 
setting behaviour of these two group of regions explains why relative unemployment 
rose in the first group and fell in the second. However, it cannot explain the general 
increase in regional disparities observed since 1988. It is the behaviour of group 3 the 
true responsible for this evidence (see again Graph 3). For this latter group, there were 
no big changes in the wage setting behaviour when we consider as the alternative wage 
the going wage in the region outside the sector. But when we consider really the “true” 
imitation effect (table 6) we observe a radical change. During the first period the 
alternative wage did not affect wage growth, while during the second period the 
alternative wage had a sizeable effect (coefficient greater than 1). In other words, these 
regions were linking their wage growth to what was happening in the whole economy. 
This fact was coincident with a strong economic upturn (1986-1991), in which 
aggregate unemployment fell by 500,000 workers. However, Group 3 increased its 
  21share in total unemployment during this period.
15 Why do we observe this change in the 
behaviour of regions in Group 3? We hypothesise that the change in the degree of 
centralisation and coordination in wage setting allowed for a stronger wage imitation 
effect, which is reflected in our estimation. In fact, we find an increase in the imitation 
effect for every group. This imitation effect had stronger repercussion during the 
upturn, given that the differentials in productivity across sectors and regions were 
greater. This explains why regional unemployment dispersion is strongly positively 
related with the business cycle. 
The imitation effect may be a reflection of the insider power in a decentralised wage 
bargaining context. Until 1986, wage bargaining was highly centralised, and insiders 
were concerned on the general conditions of the labour market (unemployment and 
wage growth). After 1986, with the decentralised model, insider´s concern moved to 
relative payment effects. This means that their objective was to maximize wage growth, 
and not to reduce unemployment. This interpretation is in line with that presented in 
Flanagan (1999), who argues that insider power is directly related to the wage 
bargaining structure. 
In order to reinforce our hypothesis, and to link our empirical results with the stylized 
facts described in Section 2, we consider a final argument. If our hypothesis were 
correct, we should expect that real unit labour costs in the different group of regions 
evolved differently, given the differences found in their wage setting mechanism, as 
already noted in the preceding paragraphs. Graph 4 shows the real unit labour costs for 
the three groups since 1988. In this Graph we have normalised the starting value to 100. 
It can be observed that unit labour costs rose more in Group 1 and Group 3, while 
remained at lower levels in Group 2. This evidence is consistent with our estimates, and 
reflects that the change in the degree of centralisation and coordination of the wage 
setting mechanism has affected the regional distribution of unemployment. Those 
regions where the relationship between bargained wages and the alternative wage rose 
most after 1988 are precisely those areas where unit labour costs increased also the 
most (Groups 1 and 3).  
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Graph 4. Real unit labour costs. 1988-1995 
 
4.- Conclusions 
The existence and persistence of strong disparities in the Spanish regional 
unemployment rates has been the topic of this paper. We have focused on the role that 
labour market institutions, namely the wage setting mechanism and its degree of 
centralisation and coordination, may have played in the explanation of such situation. 
After a summary of the absolute and relative measures of regional dispersion on the 
unemployment rate over the period 1980-1995 we concluded that these disparities were 
important in Spain and that they were strongly related to the business cycle. Economic 
upturns were positively correlated with increases in the dispersion, while recessions 
were accompanied by reductions in the disparities.  
The main contribution of this paper is to provide an explanation to this empirical fact, 
which is at odds with the theoretical arguments which often propose a negative 
relationship between disparities and business cycle. The estimation of a sectoral wage 
equation for different groups of regions (clustered according to the evolution of their 
relative unemployment rates) let us show the existence of significant differences 
concerning wage setting and the relative weight given to the internal and external 
variables. We may summarise our conclusions as follows.  
When the whole sample period is considered, we find a clear bias towards the relative 
payment criteria (alternative wage), especially when we use the national measure for 
this variable. However, we do not trust on this specification, due to fundamental 
changes in the wage setting process (change in the degree of centralisation and 
coordination) during our sample period. In any case, the finding of the great importance 
of the alternative wage is in line with other empirical works for the Spanish economy, 
  23as in Jimeno and Bentolila (1998) or in Bande et. al., (2001). In order to identify the 
influence that the change in the degree of centralisation and coordination may have 
played in the regional wage setting, we have split our sample into two subperiods 
(1980-1988 and 1989-1995). The results show that the estimated coefficients for 
productivity and the alternative wage for the three groups of regions have changed 
through the two subperiods. Is the change similar for each group? What are the 
consequences of these changes? Considering the alternative wage as measured by the 
national average wage, there has been a striking increase in the linkage between wage 
growth and the alternative income in Groups 1 and 3. These regions are those that 
perform worse in terms of unemployment. On the other hand, Group 2, despite of a 
great linkage of wages to alternative income, it also increased markedly the linkage to 
productivity, allowing thus for a smaller increase in unit labour costs. The final 
repercussion in these regions is a better performance of unemployment. 
How do these changes affect regional unemployment dispersion? Recall that 
dispersion rose dramatically after 1986. Focusing only in the observed changes in 
groups 1 and 2, these would allow to explain why relative unemployment increased in 
the first group and fell in the second since that year. But this is just a change in the 
distribution of regional unemployment, not a change in its dispersion. In order to 
explain the increase in disparities we must look at group 3 (which has shown a negative 
relative evolution of unemployment, which speeded up after 1986). We argue that this 
negative behaviour is directly related to the change in the wage setting mechanism. 
During the first period the alternative wage did not affect wage growth while, during 
the second, the alternative wage had a large effect (coefficient greater than 1). In other 
words, these regions are linking their wage growth to what is happening in the rest of 
the economy. The change in the degree of centralisation and coordination in wage 
setting allows for an stronger wage imitation effect which has stronger repercussion 
during upturns, given that the differentials in productivity across sectors and regions are 
greater. This explains why regional unemployment dispersion is strongly positively 
related with the business cycle. 
When wage bargaining is sectoral and decentralised (as in Spain since 1986), insiders 
only take into account wage growth, and not unemployment. The observed change in 
the relative weight given to both internal and external variables, however, is not related 
to changes in the insider power, but to changes in the degree of centralisation and 
coordination of wage setting, as alreday noted by Flanagan (1999). Thus, the imitation 
  24effect may be a reflection of the insider power in a more decentralised wage bargaining 
context. 
These results are similar to those found in Brunello et al. (2001) in Italy or by Bande 
et al., (2001) for Spain, but in our paper we relate this imitation effect to the business 
cycle and the repercussion in relative unemployment. Furthermore, the paper has 
important policy implications. The fact that unemployment disparities increase when 
the aggregate unemployment rate decreases and vice versa is very negative, and brings 
into light the fact that when aggregate unemployment is falling, it does not decrease in 
those regions where unemployment is a serious problem. In fact, nowadays, we may 
define the Spanish unemployment problem a regional problem (i.e. a problem of certain 
regions), and thus cannot be observed as a national problem. After this result we must 
warn the policy maker: a deep reform of the wage bargaining system (as proposed by 
Bentolila and Jimeno, 2002, or Segura, 2001)  or a strong increase in productivity in the 
less productive regions until they reach levels similar to the average are needed if the 
national unemployment problem is to be reduced. In other case, regional disparities will 
keep on increasing during upturns and decreasing during downturns, with a clear set of 
losers: the less productive regions. 
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  29Appendix A 
 
 Description of the dataset: 
Our dataset comes from the BD-MORES database, published by the Dirección 
General de Análisis y Dirección Presupuestaria  and the University of Valencia. A 
detailed description of this database can be found in Dabán et al., (2002). 
The database consists of information of 17 sectors, clasified by the NACE-CLIO 
classification (see table A1). We include the 17 Spanish regions. Finally, we 
exclude from the sample the Agriculture and Energy sectors. The first one is not 
considered because the number of wage earners is very reduced. The second one is 
excluded due to the high value of its GVA with respect to its employment, which 




CLIO R-17  
Code 
Description of the sector 
1 Agriculture 
2 Energy 
3  Metalic Minerals and Metallurgy 
4  Minerals and non Metallic products 
5 Chemistry 
6 Non  metallic  products 
7  Transport Materials   
8  Food, Brevery and Tobacco 
9  Textile, Clothing and Footwear 
10  Paper and byproducts 
11  Other Industrial Products 
12 Construction 
13 Tradable  goods 
14 Transport 
15  Credit and Insurance  
16  Other tradable services 






  30Appendix B 
Bargained wage increase by type of bargaining level  (in %) 
 
Group Local  Sectoral Sectoral  Sectoral 
   Firm  Firm Regional  Province-level Regional National Total 
1992 7  6.6 7.2 7.5 7.4 7 7.3
1993 4.7 3.6 5.1 5.8 5.2 5.2 5.5
1994 3.2 1.8 3.8 3.8 4.9 3.1 3.6
1995 3.7 3.8 4 4 3.9 3.9 3.9
1996 3.5 3.2 3.9 3.9 4.7 3.6 3.8
1997 2.3 2.1 3.2 3 3.6 2.8 2.9
1998 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.6
1999 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.7 3.1 2.9 2.7
2000 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.2 3.8 3.7
2001 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.7
2002 2.6 2.4 2.8 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.1
 
 
  31